

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00

AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-11 PM-07 H-03

INR-11 L-03 NASA-04 NSAE-00 NSC-07 OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04

PRS-01 RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-20 USIA-15 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /212 W

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P R 301433Z AUG 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4990

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 7584

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM GW US

SUBJECT: FRG VIEWS ON NPT MATTERS: ROTH VISIT TO US

REF: BONN 13574

1. I DISCUSSED NPT ASPECT OF ROTH-RANDERMANN US VISIT WITH FRG RESREP UNGERER ON AUG 29. UNGERER REVEALED SOME INTERESTING SHIFTS IN GERMAN NPT POLICY, WHICH HE BELIEVES ROTH WILL ALSO MENTION IN WASHINGTON.

2. UNGERER SAID FRG CONCERNS RE PROLIFERATION SEEM TO BE LEADING TO POLICY PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A MORE EFFECTIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SAFE-GURADS REGIME AS WELL AS MORE CAREFUL CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. SPECIFICALLY, FRG

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CONSIDERING POSSIBILTIIY OF EXPORTER COUNTRIES REQUIREING

SAFEGUARDS ON ENTIRE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE IN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, WHETHER OR NOT NPT PARTIES. THIS WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF APPLYING NPT-TYPE SAFEGUARDS (INFCIRC 153) ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS IN NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES RATHER THAN INFCIRC 66-TYPE SAFEGUARDS WHICH UNTIL NOW HAVE BEEN BASIS FOR SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM WITH NON-NPT PARTIES. THIS IS A SUBSTANTIAL SWITCH IN GERMAN THINKING.

3. FRG ALSO APPEARS TO BE CHANGING ITS POSITION SUBSTANTIALY WITH RESPECT TO CONTROL OF EXPORT OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. THREE YEARS AGO IN ZANGGER COMMITTEE DEBATE, FRG TOTALLY OPPOSED ANY SUCH RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORT OF KNOW-HOW, WHEN SUGGESTED BY US. THEY ARE NOW PROPOSING THAT EXPORTING STATES IN ZANGGER COMMITTEE (OR ITS SUCCESSOR INSTITUTION INCLUDING SOVIETS) CONSIDER AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON UNDERTAKING WHICH WOULD DEFINE THE AREAS OF TECHNOLOGY WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO PROLIFERATION IN THE THRESHOLD NON-NPT PARTY NUCLEAR STATES AND ESTABLISH PROCEDURES WHICH WOULD PROHIBIT THE EXPORT OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS BY THE RECIPIENT COUNTRY. I GET THE IMPRESSION THAT GERMANS MIGHT ALSO BE WILLING TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE TRIGGER LIST OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT ITEMS WITH A VIEW TO ADDING ADDITIONAL ITEMS SUCH AS PUMPS -- ITEMS WHICH US FOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS TRIED IN VAIN TO GET INCLUDED ON LIST.

4. UNGERER MADE THE GENERAL COMMENT THAT IN QUESTION OF EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT GERMAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS NOW SEEM TO PLAY A RELATIVELY SUBORDINATE ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF FRG POLICY, WITH NON-PROLIFERATION AS THE DOMINANT OBJECTIVE. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT ROTH MIGHT NEED HELP AND SUPPORT FROM USG IN ASSURING THAT THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS CONTINUES.

5. ON PNE QUESTION (PARA 11 REFTTEL) UNGERER SAID HE HAD TRIES TO GET CLARIFICATION FROM BONN BUT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR IN HIS OWN MIND WHAT ROTH WAS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. UNGEREE DID NOT SEE ADVANTAGES TO REMOVING ARTICLE 5 FROM TREATY AND HAS BEEN SUPPORTING US MISSION EFFORTS TO ENHANCE

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AND INSTITUTIONALIZE IAEA'S ROLE IN SERVING AS OVERSEER OF INTERNATIONAL PNE SERVICES.

6. ROTH ALSO PLANS DISCUSS FRENCH POSITION, AND PERHAPS SEEK COORDINATE APPROACH TO FRENCH WITH USG. I SAID I ASSUMED US WOULD EXPECT TO TALK TO FRANCE AT SOME POINT, BUT GUESSED THAT WE WOULD WAIT UNTIL WE HAD TALKED TO OTHERS AND ACHIEVED SOME COMMON POSITIONS AND TACTICS

ON NON-PROLIFERATION QUESTIONS.

7. OTHER POINTS MADE BY UNGERER: (A) FRG FULLY SUPPORTS NECESSITY FOR ADEQUATE DURATION AND TERMINATION PROVISIONS IN ALL IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS. THIS WAS SAID IN CONTEXT POSITION FRG WILL TAKE WITH RESPECT TO UPCOMING ARGENTINE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, AND (B) FRG DESIRES TO HAVE IAEA TAKE GREATER INTEREST IN QUESTIONS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION. FRG INTENDS MAKE STRONG STATEMENT IN THIS VEIN AT UPCOMING GENERAL CONFERENCE; VIEWS SEEM CONSISTENT WITH THOSE USG HOLDS.

8. I INFORMED UNGERER IN CONFIDENCE THAT US WOULD PROBABLY ANNOUNCE AT GC THAT WE INTEND GIVE PREFERENTIAL CONSIDERATION TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PARTY TO THE NPT IN PROVIDING GIFTS IN KIND IN SUPPORT OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY IAEA. UNGERER SAID THIS WAS ALONG LINES FRG THINKING AT MOMENT AND HE WOULD PROPOSE FRG MAKE SIMILAR STATEMENT AT SAME TIME. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT FRG HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED AN AGREED POSITION AS HOW TO HANDLE FELLOWSHIP TRAINING IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD WITHIN FRG FOR FELLOWS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SUCH AS INDIA. I EXPLAINED PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERNED LIMITATIONS WHICH USG APPLIES IN SUCH CASES, AND HOPED FRG COULD ADOPT SIMILAR CRITERIA. HE SAID QUESTION (WITH FONMIN SUPPORT) WAS BEING CONSIDERED, BUT HAD RUN INTO SUBSTANTIAL OPPOSITION FROM GERMAN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGY BUREAUCRACY WHICH FELT THAT DENIAL OF SUCH TRAINING IN SELECTED FIELDS WOULD NOT BE OF GREAT

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P R 301433Z AUG 74  
FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4991  
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VALUE IN A NON-PROLIFERATION SENSE.

9. UNGER SAID BONN HAD HAD UNDER REVIEW HOW BEST TO HANDLE ONGOING CONSULTATIONS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION MATTERS. DECISION (AGREED WITH UK) WAS TO DESIGNATE VIENNA AS LOCUS FOR CONSIDERING SUCH SUBJECTS AS SAFEGUARDS, SUPPLIER COUNTRY CONTROLS AND JOINT ACTIONS, AND PHYSICAL SECURITY. I RESPONDED FIRST TWO SUBJECTS PRESENTED NO PROBLEMS TO USG; THESE WERE ALREADY HANDLED BY MISSION. PHYSICAL SECURITY, HOWEVER, WAS A NEWLY EMERGING PROBLEM WHICH REQUIRED MUCH INPUT FROM CAPITALS. OBVIOUSLY, VIENNA MISSIONS WOULD BE HANDLING DEVELOPING IAEA INTEREST IN PHYSICAL SECURITY, BUT PROBLEM IN FIRST INSTANCE MIGHT REQUIRE EXTENSIVE BI- OR MULTI-LATERAL CONSULTATIONS TO DEVELOP COMMON POLICIES. WASHINGTON MIGHT WISH COMMENT TO ROTH IF HE RAISED THIS POINT.

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10. COMMENT: GERMAN ATTITUDE AS VIEWED FROM MISSION VANTAGE POINT HAS CHANGED SUBSTANTIALLY ON NPT MATTERS SINCE THE INDIAN EXPLOSION. WE WOULD HEARTILY ENDORSE ROTH'S PROPOSAL (IF HE MAKES IT) TO ENLARGE THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE "EXPORTERS GROUP COMMITTEE" TO INCLUDE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS AS LIMITATIONS ON EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY AND EXPANSION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS REGIME TO ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE IN NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES NOT PARTY TO THE NPT. GERMAN INITIATIVE IN THESE DIRECTIONS WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, PRODUCE MORE SYMPATHETIC AND POSITIVE REACTION IN OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN SUPPLIER COUNTRIES THAN WOULD A COMPARABLE US INITIATIVE. PORTER

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## Message Attributes

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